

The Fountainhead from Notebook to Novel

The Composition of Ayn Rand's First Ideal Man

Shoshana Milgram

The Fountainhead begins in 1922, when Howard Roark is twenty-two; covering eighteen years of the hero's life, it is the longest in time span of any of Ayn Rand's novels. The novel's composition began on December 4, 1935, with Ayn Rand's first notes for a book she planned to call "Second-Hand Lives."¹ She began writing on June 26, 1938; within the next two years, she completed the first of the four parts and six and one-half chapters of the second, and then stopped writing.² On December 9, 1941, she signed a contract with Bobbs-Merrill, and she resumed writing two days later.³ On December 31, 1942, she delivered the completed manuscript.⁴ In consultation with Archibald Ogden, whom she considered "a miracle as an editor,"⁵ she made cuts and other revisions; the novel was released on April 15, 1943, and officially published on May 10, 1943.⁶

The current article is not a full account of Ayn Rand's life during the composition of this novel. The publication of *We the Living* in the United States and Great Britain, the Broadway productions of *Night of January 16th* and *The Unconquered*, the British publication of *Anthem*, the writing of *Ideal* and *Think Twice*, the Wendell Willkie campaign and other political activities—not to mention the day jobs as reader for RKO, MGM, and Paramount—are subjects for another day. Nor will the scope of this article allow me to include all of her preparations for this novel, from her architectural research to her job with Ely Jacques Kahn. I do not even have room here to consider all the editorial changes—from the omission of extended sequences of events to the editing of passages of dialogue and description—that are evident in the notebooks and the surviving pages of her drafts, or even to describe the entire contents of the notebooks and the drafts. My goal in this article is to describe, with examples, the purposeful editorial principles she applied while writing and revising her manuscript (principles that cohere with her chosen theme), so that I can examine closely (yet still not exhaustively) the decisions she made, from notebook to novel, in projecting—for the first time—her ideal man, in the form of Howard Roark. Her choices—in style and in substance—indicate not only the changes she made in the characterization of Roark, but also, perhaps, some changes in herself.

The notebooks for *The Fountainhead* contain voluminous notes on the theme, characters, and plot, along with summaries of her research, e.g., architectural books and magazines, recommended by a librarian at the New York Public Library.⁷ The outlines and notes show the early stages of Ayn Rand's preparatory work: constructing her plots, developing her characters, identifying her themes and ideas.

Her notes, to begin with, present time lines of the architectural and personal development of Peter Keating and Roark, and to their interactions with other key characters. She refers not

only to the buildings and relationships we know from the finished novel, but also of events that are not in the surviving manuscript pages (much less in the novel), such as the suicides of a writer and a sculptor, Keating's "romance" with Lois Cook and his marriage to a blonde, Roark's fight with Gail Wynand, the suicide note Dominique gives to Wynand in response to his threats, and Roark's refusal to help the family of a contractor who has gone bankrupt and committed suicide.

She analyzes, at length, the ideas, backgrounds, and features of Roark, Keating, and Ellsworth Toohey. She has lists of possible names for the characters. She occasionally considers characters she later decided to exclude, such as the "Communist—an inhibited, embittered weakling who believes himself an idealist and embraces Communism as the cure for the world's ills."⁸

Regarding her theme, she describes different forms of second-handedness, by contrast with the first-handedness of her hero. Her notes explain how the motives and actions of Toohey, Keating, and Wynand demonstrate their fundamental dependence on others. Initially, it appears, she did not plan for Roark to deliver a speech articulating the principle by which he lived. Her notes indicate that the speech at the final trial was to be given by a distinguished old lawyer.

Although her notes are not always a coherent record of her work—many are undated, and some are cryptic—they show, in detail, how she criticized her prose (e.g., commenting to herself that her first description of Heller was "very bad"), how she decided to make cuts (e.g., noting that Roark does not need multiple girlfriends), how she gave herself "standing orders" about style (eliminating bromides) and content (eliminating redundancy). On February 18, 1940, she criticized her work to date on the first part of the novel and set forth principles for future writing and editing.⁹ She continued to monitor her progress and to articulate her principles of writing.

Her notes on her reading show that she was reading purposefully, with her novel in mind: for information about architecture in general (as art and as business), about modern architecture specifically (its practitioners and its critics). She would note, for example, that a particular critical statement was good material for Toohey, or she would ask herself what aspects of a project would depend on the architect, and which on the contractor.

Although not all of the notes are dated, the dated notes make clear that she began with the theme and the main characters and events (from December 1935 to March 1937); continued with notes on architectural books by such writers as Darcy Braddell, Lewis Mumford, and Alfred C. Bossom; and, in March 1938, returned to developing the plot. She began writing on June 26, 1938 (as noted above); but later outlined (or re-outlined) the highlights of sections as she progressed. For example, she wrote the final chapter outline for the second half of Part Two on December 17, 1941; she wrote the final chapter outline for Part Four on July 2, 1942.¹⁰

The notebooks are worth examining because they are Ayn Rand's first steps toward the novel; the hints of the intentions she ultimately rejected are provocative. Her procedures are also evidence of her artistic policies, which we can see by tracing passages from the notebooks to the manuscript to the novel. Her notes for the Enright House party (April 22, 1940) describe her subject and the means, i.e., what she wanted to show (second-handedness in the social setting) and how she wanted to show it (through representative remarks).¹¹ In the manuscript, she presents, virtually unchanged, the "what" in the form of Roark's thoughts; she presents the "how" in a sequence of brief exchanges. In the final text of the novel, she removed Roark's thoughts (and, as I will discuss later on, she was frequently to cut from the manuscript similar descriptions of his thoughts) and left only the short snatches of conversations. In *The Fountainhead*, in other words, she dispensed with the description of what she wished to show (a

description she had initially transferred straight from the notes to the draft) and relied solely on the presentation of the evidence. There are many similar examples. In the final section of my essay, a section that is speculative, I will return to the notebooks to analyze them from the standpoint of a specific change in her thinking about her hero, i.e., Nietzsche-like elements.

The manuscripts of *The Fountainhead* consist of a holograph draft of approximately 2,300 pages, a typed draft that is incomplete, a third draft (complete and typed), and a set of galleys.¹² In multiple drafts, Ayn Rand considered and revised the selection of ideas, incidents, and words. She did not preserve all the evidence of her work; sometimes she discarded pages, noting only that, e.g., “161–163 cut.” There are virtually no lapses in textual continuity in the holograph; nonetheless, the drafts, evidently, do not include all of the discards. But although the drafts do not constitute a full record of everything Ayn Rand did in the process of composing and editing, they reveal her intense dedication, her choices, and her command of her craft. As evidence of her purposeful choices, the drafts can serve as a guide to looking more closely at the details and character of the novel, the achieved result of those choices.

The holograph draft contains much material that will be unfamiliar to the reader of *The Fountainhead*, especially in the earlier parts of the novel. Ayn Rand deliberately wrote more than she expected to use; as she explained to her editor, Archibald Ogden (who thought that the first third of the novel was much too long), she wanted to have the entire novel completed before deciding what, in view of the whole, must be included.¹³ Some of the omitted scenes are easily legible in the manuscript; others are present but crossed out; it is possible that some scenes have been removed without a trace. Among the discarded scenes and sequences are Roark’s romances with Vesta Dunning and Heddy Adler; several additional scenes featuring Roark’s relationship with Henry Cameron; Ralston Holcombe’s job offer to Roark; Peter Keating’s dishonest scheme against Tim Davis; Roark’s association with Larry Dwight (a fellow draftsman at the office of John Erik Snyte); Roark’s reading of the writings of Austen Heller (along with more information about Heller’s crusades and friendship with Roark); additional conversations between Roark and Steven Mallory; a long, one-sided conversation between Roark and Toohey; and a meeting Roark attends of the New League of Proletarian Art.¹⁴

She ultimately decided, she said, to omit some scenes and sequences because they contributed nothing that was not expressed better elsewhere, or because they interfered with the overall design. One example was a sequence of scenes involving Vesta Dunning, a talented, ambitious actress romantically involved with Roark, whose desire for the approval of others was a breach in her integrity. Unable to sustain her relationship with Roark or her pursuit of her art, she was to be shown, in Part Four, as ultimately miserable and defeated.

I cut her out before I finished the book. It was after I finished Part Three, which is the Gail Wynand part, that I realized that Vesta Dunning was a variant of the same problem, in relation to the theme . . . as a person of great talent who should have been great, but didn’t quite hold out . . . it would then have taken an awful lot of psychological study and details about her, which would interfere with the major action, because she would not have been integrated to Roark’s life at all. . . . Also, it would have spoiled the nature of his relationship with Dominique. The fact that Dominique was the only woman in his life stands out better without the other relationship.¹⁵

She comments that her overall purpose guided her and that she was happy to excise repetitious parts in order to achieve the purposeful succinctness of the whole.

Her focus on her theme, on her overall purpose, governed not only the larger-scale changes (e.g., the removal of characters and sequences) she made in the drafts, but also the line-editing of descriptions, conversations, and speeches. My examples are representative rather than exhaustive. From her earliest notes (December 4, 1935), she had identified the theme as the conflict between the first-handers, who use their own minds to know the world and to choose their values, and the second-handers, who “shift the center” of their lives from their own judgments and values to those of others.¹⁶ The editing process shows her attempt not only to dramatize first- and second-handedness in characterizations, but also to make the reader’s experience true to the theme. Roark is progressively revealed as first-handed not only in his attitude to his work, but also in his every act and utterance. The reader, too, is invited to be a first-hander. As Ayn Rand composes and edits the text, she concretizes characters to the point that the reader is able to grasp directly the characters’ premises and basic values. The method of the editorial revisions coheres precisely with her theme.

In her important notes to herself of February 18, 1940, she wonders if she has given away too much of Roark too soon in the beginning of the novel.¹⁷ Her revisions of the opening chapter, accordingly, show her shortening the description of Roark’s thoughts, especially the thoughts he has while standing on the cliff, before the reader has seen him in action. She also revised, extensively, the conversation between Roark and his former Dean, to stress Roark’s first-handedness; she did so in a way that encourages the reader to observe closely the action and the dialogue, and not to rely on summary. The details speak “for themselves”: everything in the substance and manner of Roark’s behavior serves to develop his characterization. And, by reducing narrative summary, Ayn Rand gives the reader little opportunity to escape the responsibility of paying attention to the facts presented.

In the draft, the Dean says: “My dear fellow, who will want to give you work now?” Roark, in the draft, replies: “I believe I know someone who will” (I, 51–52). The Dean insultingly implies, by his rhetorical question, that Roark is unemployable as an architect, and Roark, without challenging the implication that work is something to be “given” to him, responds that he is indeed employable, that he believes he knows someone who will give him work. Roark’s reply allows the Dean to dominate the conversation; by conceding that work is to be “given,” Roark, in the draft, subordinates himself both to the Dean and to the hypothetical “givers” of work.

In the final, edited text, by contrast, the Dean asks: “How do you expect to force your ideas on [clients]?” Roark replies: “I don’t propose to force or be forced. Those who want me will come to me.” (26) Roark does not accept the terms of his interlocutor. When insulted, he does not reply with a boast on the order of “I will force them to accept my ideas by . . .” Roark instead changes the terms of the discussion, eliminates force from the discussion, and confidently states that clients who value his work will seek him out.

Other editorial changes show a similar pattern of highlighting Roark’s independent judgment and eliminating any suggestion of his dependence on other people’s judgments, on other minds. The Dean, in the draft, continues to insult Roark, saying “You are a megalomaniac,” and Roark, in the draft, responds, “I have been told that before” (I, 52), as if he has been keeping track of the opinions of other people, as if he regards their views of his nature as a potentially valuable source of reliable information.

But Roark, as a first-hander, would not consider other people as authorities on such a matter as his character.

The edited text, by contrast, has a new and revealing passage. In the final text, the Dean says:

“You know, . . . you would sound much more convincing if you spoke as if you cared whether I agreed with you or not.” “That’s true,” said Roark. “I don’t care whether you agree with me or not.” He said it so simply that it did not sound offensive, it sounded like the statement of a fact which he noticed, puzzled, for the first time. (26)

The Dean’s insult and Roark’s response are directly focused on first-versus-second-handedness. When Roark says “That’s true,” he does not mean that the Dean’s assertion is true, i.e., that he, Roark, would be more convincing if he sounded as if he cared about the Dean’s agreement. Roark does not care to sound “more convincing” to this Dean and has no interest in hearing how to achieve a goal that is not his. But Roark, instead of taking offense at the insult, and instead of trying to learn how his attitude affects other people, takes from the Dean’s statement the single feature that interests him: an observation about his own nature that his own judgment confirms. As edited and improved, Roark’s response better reflects his first-handedness.

At the end of the conversation, when the Dean—in the draft and also in the final text—tells Roark, “You are a man not to be encouraged. You are dangerous,” Roark, in the draft, responds: “That defines those to whom I am dangerous” (I, 52). The tone is uncharacteristically stiff and formal, indicative of a degree of care and attention: the draft’s Roark is delivering a diagnosis of his opponents. Roark’s response in the final, edited version of the text is different. When the Dean says, “You are dangerous,” Roark replies, briefly, directly, and dismissively: “To whom?” The first version focuses on the nature of his opponents; the second version dismisses the Dean’s comment as insignificant. The revised version of Roark’s response emphasizes the nature of Roark himself rather than the definition of his enemies: the implied grammatical subject of Roark’s sentence—“To whom [am I dangerous]?” is “I.”

The revised exchange is well integrated with another small episode earlier in the conversation. The Dean asks: “My dear fellow, who will let you [build that way]?” Roark replies: “That’s not the point. The point is, who will stop me?” (23). Roark’s response in this earlier exchange makes explicit his dismissal of the Dean’s notion that building requires permission; there as here, Roark focuses instead on his own concerns. For Roark, certain that no one can stop him, “who will stop me?” is a rhetorical question. His implicit self-confidence explains why he does not need to answer the Dean’s inquiry (“who will let you?”).

At the end of the scene, Ayn Rand’s editing sharpens the characterization and the context with simple omissions. In the draft, Roark “bowed and left the room. ‘The professor of mathematics,’ thought the Dean, looking at the closed door, ‘is crazy’” (I, 52). For the final text, Ayn Rand removed the Dean’s thoughts. To include them is not only to feature the Dean more prominently than necessary, but to repeat what is already known.

The scene has already made abundantly clear that, for the Dean, adherence to tradition overrides any attention to engineering, which is important to the math professor. From the characterization of Roark, moreover, Ayn Rand removed the inconsistent touch of a bow. Although Roark is polite to the Dean, he is not deferential; to include the bow is to emphasize respect, which Roark does not believe the Dean deserves—not for his views on architecture, and not for his character.

An additional instance of purposeful editing appears in Roark’s post-interview thoughts about the character of the Dean. In the draft: “He understood the Dean, and he had understood

men such as the Dean long ago, and it had ceased to disturb him. But he still wondered, and he wondered about it often, what made those men such as they were” (I, 53). The description, in the draft, appears self-contradictory: if Roark has to wonder, often, what made men such as the Dean such as they were, how can he be said to understand them at all, much less to have understood them “long ago”? Moreover, why would a first-hander wonder, and wonder often, about other people?

The final, edited text is significantly different: “He had met many men such as the Dean; he had never understood them. He knew only that there was some important difference between his actions and theirs. It had ceased to disturb him long ago.” (27) The revised text distinguishes between what Roark grasps (that these men are essentially unlike him) and what he does not grasp (what that essential difference is). The draft, with the word “often,” undercuts Roark’s basic imperviousness to other people—“he wondered about it often.” In the final text, by contrast: “But he wondered, at times, what made them such as they were.” The “long ago” applies not to his understanding of them—because, in fact, he does not understand them even now—but to his long-standing serenity: “it had ceased to disturb him long ago.”

Within the same passage, Ayn Rand adds several sentences that, not yet present in the first draft, figure significantly in the final text: “But he always looked for a central theme in buildings and he looked for a central impulse in men. He knew the source of his actions; he could not discover theirs. . . . He had never learned the process of thinking about other people.” These new sentences may be Ayn Rand’s response to her advice to herself in the notes of February 18, 1940: “Roark looking for the ‘stamp’ on faces—should be planted earlier and separately and more importantly.”¹⁸ The sentences clarify the contrast between Roark’s nature and the nature of second-handers, and also place the paragraph’s emphasis more powerfully on Roark and not on other people.

The manuscript of the early chapters of *The Fountainhead* contains numerous changes—small yet significant—in expression and emphasis. Even after years of preparation, Ayn Rand spent many months writing and rewriting the opening chapters, to clarify and enhance the theme. But her editing was not limited to the beginning of the book. Similarly purposeful revisions are apparent in her editing of Roark’s speech at the Cortlandt trial. She was writing rapidly, contract in hand, to meet her publication deadline. The manuscript, nonetheless, shows her in the act of revising her text to emphasize her theme.

First-handedness is important not only in the speech itself, but in the introduction. Although Roark is speaking in public, he is not primarily concerned with his audience. Before “a hostile crowd,” Roark stands “as each man stands in the innocence of his own mind” (677). The draft also contains the following sentence: “No one ever knew that the moment preceding his speech had held the essence of human brotherhood” (IV, 568). The sentence was intended to convey that the independence represented by Roark is a prerequisite for any healthy human bond. But the sentence, as originally written, calls attention to the fact that no one ever understood the event in this way.

Ayn Rand drew a line through this sentence, probably on the spot. In editing, she removed the assertion of a conclusion not reached first-hand by the individuals present. The account in the final text reports specifically the actual thoughts of the audience, rather than the conclusion no one ever knew. Roark moves his audience to emulate, to some degree, his independent stance: he inspires each of the jurors and spectators to experience independence.

For the flash of an instant, they grasped the manner of his consciousness. Each asked himself: “do I need anyone’s approval?—does it matter?—am I tied?” And

for that instant, each man was free—free enough to feel benevolence for every other man in the room. It was only a moment: the moment of silence when Roark was about to speak. (677)

The description here includes a point made in the discarded sentence, i.e., that only an independent person can be benevolent toward others. The final version is superior because it limits the reader to what the characters knew first-hand and does not rely on the narrator as an expert, uninvolved witness.

Ayn Rand's revision of the aftermath of the speech is similarly purposeful, both in what it adds and what it omits. When the jury returns to deliver its verdict, and the prisoner is asked to rise and face the jury, Ayn Rand added, between the lines, the following sentence: "At the back of the room, Wynand got up and stood also" (I, 594). She edited the text to show that Wynand, Roark's tragic foil, knew that he was also on trial. A first-hander in his soul, he has acted as a second-hander in the pursuit of power. When she adds a line indicating that Wynand stands, she shows that this trial concerns not only Roark's guilt or innocence regarding a particular act, but the thematic conflict between the first-hander and the second-hander, as dramatized in the contrast between the heroic ideal and his foil. The final text of this chapter concludes with Wynand's departure: "The first movement of Roark's head was not to look at the city in the window, at the judge or at Dominique. He looked at Wynand. Wynand turned sharply and walked out. He was the first man to leave the courtroom" (686). Her edited version not only reports (as did the draft) that Wynand left first, but emphasizes the fact by having him rise when Roark rises, and by ending the chapter when Wynand walks out.

In the draft, by contrast, the chapter ends as follows: "The rest of the audience did not move to go. The commentators could not explain it afterwards: the audience was cheering" (IV, 595). In editing the chapter, Ayn Rand crossed out those sentences, which emphasize the crowd's behavior and the commentators' lack of comprehension. The revised conclusion focuses not on the crowd or the commentators, but on a single man. For Wynand, the outcome of the trial was the demonstration of the tragic futility of his self-betrayal.

Ayn Rand's editing of the trial speech itself emphasized first-handedness by removing specific historical and political references to the world outside the novel. Ayn Rand chose to omit references to Caesar, the Crusades, the Inquisition, Robespierre, Napoleon, Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler.¹⁹ In making some of these omissions, she was following the advice of Isabel Paterson, who suggested that she cut the references to contemporary politics because "the theme of your book is wider than the politics of the moment."²⁰ Because the theme of *The Fountainhead* is "individualism and collectivism, not in politics, but in man's soul,"²¹ the theme is wider than not only the politics of the moment, but also politics itself. Ayn Rand cut not only Stalin, but also Robespierre. By removing from Roark's speech the political references, therefore, Ayn Rand was editing her book to be more focused on its theme.

She also chose to omit several other specific historical references. The manuscript supplies names for the heroes described in the paragraph beginning "Throughout the centuries there were men who took first steps down new roads armed with nothing but their own vision" and ending "They fought, they suffered—and they paid. But they won" (678). In both draft and text, Roark refers to creators and to their achievements (the airplane, the power loom, anesthesia, etc.). But the manuscript had listed additional such heroes.

Ayn Rand originally intended to take the reader farther away from the events of the novel itself. On a hard-to-read page, with many cross-outs, Ayn Rand originally had Roark provide a list of creators and an inventory of their suffering:

Socrates, poisoned by order of the democracy of Athens. Jesus Christ against the majority of (indecipherable) crucified. Joan D'Arc, who was burned at the stake. Galileo, made to renounce his soul. Spinoza, excommunicated. Luther, hounded. Victor Hugo, exiled for twenty years. Richard Wagner, writing musical comedies for a living, denounced by the musicians of his time, hissed, opposed, pronounced unmusical. Tchaikovsky, struggling through years of loneliness without recognition. Nietzsche, dying in an insane asylum, friendless and unheard. Ibsen [indecipherable] his own country. Dostoevsky, facing an execution squad and pardoned to a Siberian prison. The list is endless. (IV, 570)

Ayn Rand edited out the endless list. Suffering, to begin with, is less important, in this speech, than achievement; for this reason, Ayn Rand also removed the sentence stating that the “history of mankind[’s] benefactors is the history of martyrs.” Although Roark does not minimize the price paid by the creators, he would not wish to claim their pain as a value. To describe their specific suffering without also acclaiming their specific achievements would not suit his purpose; to explain, at his trial, the contributions made by Socrates, Galileo, Hugo, and the others would turn the speech into a history lesson. To make his point at his trial, Roark does not need such a list. To grasp his point, the reader does not need such a list. Roark himself is Ayn Rand’s dramatic example of the struggle and achievement of the first-hander, the individual of unborrowed vision.

Roark is not merely one in a long line of creators. The others, to be sure, are analogous to Roark in some respects; their lives, however, are not heroic in all respects. By removing the references, Ayn Rand leads the reader to focus not on such flawed individuals as Luther or Wagner, but on the character of Roark, who exemplifies first-handedness more purely and powerfully than any of the actual historical figures.

In two instances, Ayn Rand’s omission of references within Roark’s trial speech appears to stem from a policy, evident in other contexts within the novel, of curtailing allusions to religion and to Nietzsche, two forms of pseudo-first-handedness. The final text of the speech contains the following sentence: “Men have come close to the truth, but it was destroyed each time . . .” (683). When Ayn Rand composed this passage, she initially made Roark much more explicit about what “coming close” might mean.

Christ proclaimed the untouchable integrity of Man’s spirit, stating[?] the first rights of the Ego. He placed the salvation of one’s own soul above all other concerns. But men distorted it into altruism. Nietzsche, who loved Man, fought against altruism—and destroyed his own case by preaching the Will to Power, a second-hander’s pursuit. (IV, 588a)

In her “Introduction to the Twenty-fifth Anniversary Edition” of *The Fountainhead*, Ayn Rand discusses both religion and Nietzsche. She explains that, when she had Roark speak of “the highest religious abstraction,” she meant not “religion as such,” but “man’s code of good and evil, with the emotional connotations of height, uplift, nobility, reverence, grandeur, which pertain to the realm of man’s values, but which religion has arrogated to itself” (viii). She did not, of course, intend the phrase “the highest religious abstraction” as an endorsement of religion, but she did not explain, within the novel, her purpose in using the phrase. In the introduction, she takes the opportunity of clarifying her position instead of leaving it “to

implications.” Ayn Rand also quotes a passage from Section 287 of Part 9 (“What Is Noble”) of Nietzsche’s *Beyond Good and Evil*:

It is not the works, but the *belief* which is here decisive and determines the order of rank—to employ once more an old religious formula with a new and deeper meaning—it is some fundamental certainty which a noble soul has about itself, something which is not to be sought, is not to be found, and perhaps, also, is not to be lost.—*The noble soul has reverence for itself.*—²²

She states that Nietzsche, in spite of his mysticism and irrationalism, “as a poet, . . . projects at times (not consistently) a magnificent feeling for man’s greatness. . . .” Although Ayn Rand removed the quotation, which she had placed at the head of her manuscript, from the published book, she loved the exalted sense of life it expresses. “With this opportunity to explain it, I am glad to bring it back” (x).

Ayn Rand recognized that religious language can have the noble emotional connotations of “man’s dedication to a moral ideal”(ix) and that Nietzsche’s language “sums up the emotional consequences for which *The Fountainhead* provides the rational, philosophical base” (x). It is not surprising that her drafts for *The Fountainhead* included references, implicit and explicit, to religion and to Nietzsche. But Ayn Rand was fundamentally opposed to religion and to Nietzsche’s philosophy, and did not wish to endorse either of them. In editing *The Fountainhead*, therefore, Ayn Rand reduced or removed references to both.

First-handedness, the novel’s moral ideal, is associated through language with religion’s ideal, or God. The night after Wynand betrays Roark is one example. Realizing that he has continually betrayed his own soul, Wynand walks through the city and—in both the draft and the final text—speaks the words of confession: “*Mea culpa—mea culpa—mea maxima culpa*” (662).²³ The drafts, however, had a long additional passage in which the human creative act is described in divine terms. Wynand says:

I had the only sacred attribute among the endowments of man. The touch of God. The quality of Roark’s nature, which he recognized in me as I recognized it in him. The faculty of being a source and a beginning. Whatever the goal, I had the means of creation. Whatever the achievement, I was one of those who can achieve. I built the Banner. I fought for it, and there was fire in the fight, and courage, and gallantry. I loved the Banner. Because I had made it. May God now damn me for it. That was the sin for which there is no forgiveness. That I took genius and placed it in the service of the unspeakable. (IV, 521)

The final text, which drops the references to the “touch of God” and the unforgivable “sin,” loses nothing. The episode ends, poignantly, with the words: “I was not born to be a second-hander.” The term “second-hander” is specific to the novel; Wynand has learned from Roark the concept and the term.

The manuscript version, moreover, had an additional paragraph, a quotation from the Bible: Matthew 12:31–32:

All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men: but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men. And whosoever speaketh against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him: but whosoever speaketh against

the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come.

The quotation contrasts blasphemy against the Son of man, which is forgivable, with blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which is not. Wynand has betrayed not only Roark, his friend, at this moment, but his own soul, his spirit, throughout his life. Roark's forgiveness, then, even though it is freely offered, is not sufficient, and Wynand does not accept it because it does not solve his problem.

The Biblical quotation adds nothing but a distracting association with religion. Removing the paragraph gives Wynand, not the Bible, the last word—as he pronounces his spiritual death sentence. In editing the manuscript, Ayn Rand removes many such religious references, including Mallory's thought that "In the beginning was the Word" (IV, 15) and Roark's proclamation, in his speech to the jury, of loyalty to his "faith," "whose purpose, in the words of my own religious catechism, is: to praise man and glorify him forever" (IV, 593). The Roark we know does not make a point of invoking religion, even if he accepts Hopton Stoddard's statement (ghostwritten by Ellsworth Toohey) that Roark is a religious man in his own way (319).

She pursued a similar policy in removing not only the passage from Nietzsche that had stood at the head of her manuscript, but all explicit references to Nietzsche. Not only had Ayn Rand selected a Nietzsche quotation for the novel as a whole, she had also selected one for each of the novel's four sections.²⁴ The epigraph for "Peter Keating" was excerpted from Section 261 of *Beyond Good and Evil*.

Vanity is one of the things which are perhaps most difficult for the noble man to understand: he will be tempted to deny it, where another kind of man thinks he sees it self-evidently. The problem for him is to represent to his mind beings who seek to arouse a good opinion of themselves which they do not possess—and consequently also do not "deserve"—and who yet believe in this good opinion afterwards.²⁵

Nietzsche's passage suggests the first-hander's difficulty in understanding the second-hander.

The epigraph to "Ellsworth Toohey" was drawn from Part II of *Thus Spake Zarathustra* ("The Tarantulas"): "Ye preachers of equality, the tyrant-frenzy of impotence crieth thus in you for 'equality'; your most secret tyrant-longings disguise themselves thus in virtue-words!"²⁶ Nietzsche's sentences (and those that immediately follow) suggest that professional egalitarians are motivated by envy and power-lust.

The epigraph to "Gail Wynand" is taken from Part I of *Thus Spake Zarathustra* ("The Tree on the Hill"): "But by my love and hope I conjure thee: cast not away the hero in thy soul: Maintain holy thy highest hope!"²⁷ Gail Wynand, not born to be a second-hander, has cast away the hero in his soul.²⁸ The paragraphs preceding the sentence Ayn Rand quoted are also pertinent here:

Ah! I have known noble ones who lost their highest hope. And then they disparaged all high hopes.

Then lived they shamelessly in temporary pleasures, and beyond the day had hardly an aim.

"Spirit is also voluptuousness,"—said they. Then broke the wings of their spirit; and now it creepeth about, and defileth where it gnaweth.

Once they thought of becoming heroes; but sensualists are they now. A trouble and a terror is the hero to them.

The epigraph to “Howard Roark” is excerpted from Section 12 of the essay “‘Good and Evil,’ ‘Good and Bad,’” in *On the Genealogy of Morals*.

But from time to time do ye grant me—one glimpse, grant me but one glimpse only, of something perfect, fully realized, happy, mighty, triumphant, of something that still gives cause for fear! A glimpse of man that justifies the existence of man, a glimpse of an incarnate human happiness that realizes and redeems, for the sake of which one may hold fast to the belief in man!²⁹

The victory of Howard Roark is indeed a “glimpse of man that justifies the existence of man.”

One can see the appeal of Nietzsche’s poetry and the significance of the passages Ayn Rand selected. But she could hardly quote the passages without naming him, and to do so might have been taken as an endorsement. To feature another writer prominently in her own art, moreover, is to place herself, as a writer, in his shadow. She decided to do otherwise.

Ayn Rand also removed an explicit reference to Nietzsche within the text of the novel. Speaking with Steven Mallory after the Stoddard Temple trial, Roark, in the draft, starts by quoting from Part I (“Voluntary Death”) of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. “That your dying may not be a reproach to man and the earth, my friend: that do I solicit for the honey of your soul.”³⁰ Roark continues:

Your dying—or your suffering. Oh, can’t you understand it? To love the earth . . . so much that your sense of the world cannot include suffering as a basic factor. To suffer, if necessary, but never completely, never losing the vision, never letting your suffering deny it, so that you never become a solid screaming pain and twist the world into a mere bandage. To keep that sense of the world within you alive because that is what man’s life was meant to be, and is. That, Steve, is the way I want to suffer and the way I want to die some day. (II, 563)

Nietzsche says that one must die in a spirit befitting the glory of life; Roark says that neither suffering nor death can be allowed to destroy one’s love for life. Although Roark’s attitude regarding pain is an important element of Roark’s character, this particular quotation, with its emphasis on death, is not the best match for his spirit.

After the revisions, what was left in the text of Nietzsche’s language? First, Ayn Rand included an indirect allusion in Ellsworth Toohey’s column on the Stoddard Temple: “It is not our function—paraphrasing a philosopher whom we do not like—to be a fly swatter, but when a fly acquires delusions of grandeur, the best of us must stoop to do a little job of extermination” (338). The philosopher he does not like is Nietzsche; the passage he paraphrases appears in Part I of *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (“The Flies of the Marketplace”).³¹

This subtle allusion was acceptable in the context of the novel. The endorsement issue, to begin with, does not arise. That Toohey dislikes Nietzsche does not necessarily mean that Ayn Rand admires him. It is entirely characteristic of Toohey, moreover, to minimize the significance of philosophy by treating it as a matter of likes and dislikes. And the passage itself is an ironic choice for Toohey, who is himself the fly with delusions of grandeur, a creature whom Roark and Wynand deem unworthy of swatting.

Toohey alludes again to Nietzsche by printing in the *Banner* a photograph of Roark “at the opening of the Enright House, the photograph of a man’s face in a moment of exaltation,” with the caption: “Are you happy, Mr. Superman?” (342). Toohey’s offensive rhetorical question implies that Nietzsche’s “Overman,” his image of the noble hero, is ludicrous to contemplate (as for him, perhaps, it was ludicrous to attempt to achieve it).

The final allusion to Nietzsche appears in Roark’s letter to Wynand after Wynand’s act of self-betrayal. Roark writes: “What you think you’ve lost can neither be lost nor found” (664). Ayn Rand here has Roark come close to quoting the passage she had originally placed at the head of her manuscript: “some fundamental certainty which a noble soul has about itself, something which is not to be sought, is not to be found, and, perhaps, also is not to be lost.” She removed the quotation, but retained the echo.

One more echo is found within her introduction to the twenty-fifth anniversary edition of *The Fountainhead*, the very place where she took the opportunity to clarify her position regarding Nietzsche. She wrote: “This is one of the cardinal reasons of *The Fountainhead*’s lasting appeal: it is a confirmation of the spirit of youth, proclaiming man’s glory, showing how much is possible.” The expression “how much is possible” had earlier been featured in the thoughts of Kira Argounova in *We the Living*. Kira had thought about the “streets of a big city where so much is possible”; she had sent Leo off to the south to be cured of his illness, saying “I love you. So much is still possible!” When she died, she “smiled, her last smile, to so much that had been possible.”³² This sentiment, as we shall see, is proclaimed, repeatedly, in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*: “How many things are still possible!”³³

Two additional special sorts of omissions are evident in Ayn Rand’s editing of the characterization of Roark: she limited, severely, his thoughts and comments about his relationship with Dominique, and she removed many passages tracing his progress toward discovering the principle of first-handedness.

First, the romance with Dominique, which, in Ayn Rand’s view, was the “ideal romance,” and which, at first, she intended to narrate, in large part, from the viewpoint of her ideal man. In the final text of the novel, the relationship is presented overwhelmingly (though not exclusively) from Dominique’s point of view. In the first draft, Roark has more much to say and to think about their romance as seen in their first meeting. The novel describes Dominique’s thoughts about her first sight of Roark. And what does Roark think? The novel is silent on that point—except for what one can infer from Dominique’s observations and from Roark’s subsequent behavior. In the first draft, by contrast:

Roark looked at her. His first glance at her had been a perception not of sight, but of touch; it was the consciousness not of a visual presence, but of a slap in the face. He grasped nothing save a challenge like an explosion, like a scream. Then he saw it was a woman standing on the rocks above, a woman with an invisible stamp, his own stamp, upon a white face that presented to him the final, the complete reality of what he had sought, of what he had found but a hint of in others. That face was freedom—a freedom proud enough to warrant enchainment [?]; it was strength—sure enough of itself to deserve to be fought; it was will—great enough for the honor of being broken. He stood very still looking at her as at a mirror, to reflect his power, and knew that he wanted to break this woman. But he did not state what form the act of breaking her was to assume, because he knew it, because there was but one way to it, and more—because she knew, because she was held by that knowledge. [*crossed out*: He felt his tongue press

against his teeth, shut tight together. His fingers closed about the handle of the drill as if about her wrist; had it been her wrist, the bones would have broken.]

Were they to speak of it for the rest of their lives, they could have added nothing; everything was said as they looked silently at each other. There were many things in that glance, but above all there was a pledge, cold and quiet in its finality, like an ultimatum declaring a war. (II, 15–15a)

In the draft, when Dominique sees Roark enter her home, she whispers: “What do you want?” He answers: “You know what I want” (II, 65). In the final text, they say nothing; at this dramatic moment, they understand each other without words, and the novel stresses that silent understanding. Ayn Rand originally planned to echo this exchange later in the novel. After learning that the man from the quarry is the architect of the Enright House, Dominique goes to Roark’s apartment. He asks: “What do you want?” She replies: “You know what I want” (272). Although removing the exchange from the first scene resulted in removing the piquant contrast with the second scene, Ayn Rand decided to do so anyway, to avoid interfering with the drama of the wordless romantic encounter.

She shortened, too, the identification of Dominique’s emotions during that first encounter: “She fought because she could not bear the pleasure. She fought because she hated herself for that pleasure. She fought him because she wanted him too much” (II, 68). In editing this passage, Ayn Rand removed the over-explicit description of Dominique’s consciousness. Roark, of course, understands without words everything Dominique does not say.

The two of them have always understood each other without words. “They could always speak like this to each other, continuing a conversation they had not begun” (344). “They stood silently before each other for a moment, and she thought that the most beautiful words were those which were not needed” (374). “We never need to say anything to each other when we’re together” (376).

In the draft, Dominique admits, later on, that she knew he could read her soul: “I lied when I fought against you. I wanted it then—I wanted what you did to me—you knew it” (II, 240). In the final text, Ayn Rand makes clear Dominique’s willing embrace of Roark not only through the entire context of the Connecticut episode, but also through a phrase added for the final text: “the kind of rapture she had wanted” (217). No part of “she had wanted” is hard to understand; that some readers have missed the point does not mean Ayn Rand did not make it.

Here is a similarly over-explicit passage. At a time when Roark is trying to build his career and Dominique is trying to destroy it, they spend evenings together at a country inn. The nights are mentioned in the final text (310), but without any of the following dialogue, which appears in the first draft. Dominique asks:

“You’re very busy at the office these days, aren’t you?”

“Yes.”

“I wonder why you take time to think of me or to come here with me.”

He answered: “Don’t you know that designing a building is overcoming a terrible resistance? I don’t mean from clients and people. I mean, in the act of designing itself. It’s facing a raw chaos where anything is possible and making it take on a single possibility, yours, making it take your rules, your shape, your meaning. It’s an act of conquest. Every good building, like any living thing, has the coherence of a single, organized purpose. The giving of a purpose is the giving of life. Look at any organism. And it’s the great, dead, formless,

purposeless mass of the undifferentiated that fights the thing being torn out of it and the man who tears it out. Haven't you ever laughed at the damn fools who think of an artist as gentle—and give him birds, flowers or clouds for a symbol? The artist has only one symbol—the sword. All art is an act of conquest. Every single thing worth doing is an act of conquest. Being alive is an act of conquest.” He smiled and leaned closer to her. “Well, do you think I'm being inconsistent when I come here? A man who loves his work can't seek rest in its opposite or in forgetting it completely. That would be the most exhausting kind of torture possible. He can seek pleasure only in another form of the same struggle. In another resistance. In another conquest.”

He threw the blanket off her naked body, but he did not touch her; he sat looking at her. Then he added: “Do you want it said clearer? I like to come here because I know what you went through before you came here. That you fought against coming because you wanted it too much. That you lie here, wishing me not to touch you—because you want it too much. That every time I kiss you, it's an act of violation—but that you welcome the violation, and the agony, and the struggle, because you want all of it as I want it, because you want nothing except as I want it. Because I . . .”

But he did not say the word. His mouth was on hers. She whispered only: “Yes, Roark Yes. . . .” (II, 351–53)

Why did Ayn Rand edit out these and similar passages (including, for example, his waiting for her, in Part Two, to come to his apartment after she has learned who he is, or his explaining to her, in Part Three, why he does not want her to spend the night with him in Ohio)? Because, I believe, she considered this sort of explanation highly inappropriate for Roark's style as we see it and him for most of the novel. For him to speak at length—as he does, finally, with Wynand on the yacht, or as he does at his second trial—is what we have been waiting for, and the waiting, perhaps, is itself a point. The explanations offered in the unpublished passages are, in essentials, consistent with Roark's characterization, but the act of explaining at length (to himself or to anyone else) is not. In Ayn Rand's esthetic, moreover, the artist's job is to develop character through action—and a good description of action does not require separate commentary. Concretizing the human ideal, projecting the ideal man, means showing him in action—not telling about him or letting him tell about himself. In editing *The Fountainhead*, she acted on the premise that certain insights should be inferred by the reader, rather than supplied by the writer.

This point—that Ayn Rand's esthetic encourages active reading—is relevant to my second group of passages, all of which concern some degree of uncertainty or lack of clarity on Roark's part, whether explicit (not knowing the explanation for what other people are, what he is, and what the difference is) or implicit (believing that he should act differently, or experiencing some degree of hesitation, or actually approaching some degree of second-handedness). Some of these passages delineate Roark's thinking as he wonders about the principle behind the Dean, and the eureka moment when he reaches an answer.

Consider the following scene, in which Roark looks at his name on the door of his first office:

He stood in the hall for a long time, looking at that inscription. Then he thought suddenly that his eyes were not looking at it, but that he was trying to give his

eyes the glances of other people who would pass down the hall and read it. He felt astonished and ashamed without reason. He went in, and slammed his door; he picked up a T-square from his desk and flung it down again carelessly, noisily, as if throwing an anchor. (I, 441)

It is difficult to imagine the Roark we know as being “ashamed without reason,” or as second-handed in any way.

Here is an example of Roark telling himself that he ought to worry more than he does about the world of other people, the commissions he is not receiving:

Those things happening to him, in those offices of strangers, were only details, unsubstantial incidents in the path of a substance they could not reach or touch. Nothing was happening to him, it was happening only in that secondary reality, in that sub-reality called himself-among-other-men. And he had no time to think of that too much: no time and no room in those boundaries within him, which were too full. He shrugged and went on, thinking that he should experience more anxiety about it, telling himself dutifully that he was anxious, that he was afraid, wondering why he could not feel it, not as a close, driving pain, not as a wrench upon his senses, the senses that remained stubbornly untouched, open, serene. (I, 342)

Compare this passage with the equivalent in the novel (101–2). It is difficult to imagine Roark wondering why he does not feel more afraid or anxious than he does.

There are a large number of passages in which Roark considers, but does not resolve, the issue of the difference between himself and others. Here, for example, is a longer version of the conversation with Austen Heller that appears in the text (159–60). In the first draft, Roark says, among other things:

I'd beg, if I could. Only I can't. I don't know how. I'm not unwilling. I'm merely a cripple, in some respect. . . . There's something missing in me. I know it, I've always known it. But I don't know what it is. Something I have, that stops me, or something I've never had and should? I don't know. And I guess I'm calloused. I know that thing about myself and I wonder about it sometimes, but I can't make myself worry, and perhaps I should. (I, 526)

He goes on to talk, as he does in the final text, about the principle behind his “kind of people.” He considers the matter, but does so, at this point, without the continual worrying.

Here are Roark's thoughts, in the first draft, about the commissions he refuses (e.g., the request for an English Tudor cottage):

It seemed to him that each time he refused a commission, he was not losing one client: he was losing many. . . [In] corners unknown to him, some man with a building to be erected would pause for a moment of consideration before his name and would be stopped by a friend, some friend who had never seen Roark and who would say: “Roark? Oh no, not Roark! I hear he's impossible to get along with!” He knew this was happening, he wondered about it, but it did not disturb him, even though he told himself that it should. . . . (I, 574–75)

In the final text, he is aware of the rumors, but does not tell himself that he should be disturbed (174–75).

In the first draft of the Enright House party, Roark is described as “willing to learn anything, even this”:

Then Roark was introduced to many people and many people spoke to him. He listened, he looked about him, without resentment, in helpless bewilderment. He had decided not to be bored, he had decided to understand, [*crossed out*: Heller and Keating were right,] he had to learn and he was willing to learn anything, even this, if this was what people wanted of him, if this was what he had to give while they would give him buildings and let him build as he pleased, in exchange for seeing him in a drawing-room. . . . (II, 210)

They did not seek to see him; they sought to be seen by him. . . . It was an immense concern with one’s brothers, leading to the hatred of one’s brothers.

Roark saw this without understanding. He thought helplessly: that’s what it is, but why? Why? He found no answer, and no one could have given him an answer; none could see the answer, because no one saw even the fact itself. Why, thought Roark. (II, 213–14)

You can see the pattern: Roark asks a question, the asking suggests the answer, he does not reach the answer, he moves on. Among the similar passages is a crossed-out remark he makes to Wynand, in the first draft, in which he says, “There’s something involved that I’ve never been able to state. And I’ve always wanted to. Perhaps I will, some day” (IV, 102; 548 in the novel).

For Roark, in the first draft, there is a eureka moment on Wynand’s yacht (IV, 300–305 in the first draft; 603–4 in the novel). “Roark was looking at that which he had worked to discover all his life.” The moment comes when Wynand is talking about altruism and altruists, and he names Stalin and Hitler. Roark says: “There’s another name for altruism,” and then he says: “Oh God, Gail! . . . God help you!” Also on the page, we see that he says—as he does in the final text—“Yes, Gail,” with what Wynand hears as “a reluctance that sounds almost like sadness.” He continues: “It’s just something I thought . . . I’ve been thinking of this for a long time. And particularly all these days when you’ve made me lie on deck and loaf.” When Wynand asks him what he’s been thinking about, Roark says: “Something I’ve known all my life, but couldn’t understand. This is the first time I was able to stop and bring it all into order. Now I have. Now I know. The principle behind the Dean who fired me from Stanton.” The final text of the novel includes the scene in which Ayn Rand originally planned to include this eureka moment. Roark indeed refers, during the yacht trip, to grasping the principle behind the Dean. But the moment is not presented as a dramatic, emphatic event. We need to infer its equivalent.

The first draft presents the eureka moment as Roark’s discovery of the principle, as if he had not grasped it until that instant. The final version, to be sure, makes clear that Roark at one time did not grasp the principle explicitly, and that going on vacation has allowed him to reflect and to grasp it—but the drama of the moment is in Roark’s thoughts about what will happen to Wynand. Ayn Rand removes from the final text the implication that we have witnessed the moment in which Roark grasps the principle—as she has removed several passages in which he grapples with the principle.

Although the passages that I have grouped together are not the same in all respects, all of them, esthetically, emphasize something in Roark that Ayn Rand deemed nonessential: the

moments when Roark was not entirely Roark, or the moments when, from the standpoint of an explicit grasp of a principle, Roark was not yet Roark.

Why did Ayn Rand remove instances in which Roark was less than himself? Because, as she envisioned her ideal man, he was always essentially himself, never less than himself—that is what being an ideal man means—and she decided to focus the characterization on essentials. And why did she remove instances of Roark’s thinking about the issue of second-handedness? Because his explicit thoughts on this matter were not central to the novel.

Roark as a character is what he is, essentially, always. As Steven Mallory says, Roark is immortal, and “one can imagine him existing forever” (452). Granted, he is not infallible. He admits to the mistakes of staying too long in school, of “seeing hope where [he] shouldn’t” with Vesta (in the first draft), of helping Peter Keating. But *The Fountainhead* is a plot story—unlike, for example, *Anthem*, which was much more about the process of discovery. The plot involves him in conflict with the world, not with himself. He is at peace with himself. He is not deeply concerned about the people he does not understand.

The reader, by contrast, is likely to need to learn—not by narration, but through following the plot—the nature of first-handedness and second-handedness, and the consequences of choosing one rather than the other. For the novel to portray the ideal man in the act of discovery would not necessarily be a bad thing—depending on a novel’s theme—but in this case it would do for the reader what the reader should be doing independently.

And so, although Ayn Rand uses the principle behind the Dean as a point of reference, she does not portray her ideal man in the act of grasping that principle. At the Dean’s office, Roark has a question in his mind. When he speaks on the yacht’s deck with Wynand, he has an answer, and, indeed, he says—in the novel—that he has arrived at an answer to a long-standing question. That he is changeless in his fundamentals is more important than that he undergoes some change in his understanding. The explicit grasp of a morality that has always been his implicit morality cannot figure in this novel as a climax, and hence Ayn Rand chose not to feature Roark’s progress toward that explicit grasp as a major network of events in the novel. She chose instead—in the climax and throughout the novel—to show Roark in active conflict. She resolves that conflict in the Cortlandt trial and offers, as a summation and an epilogue, the final image of her ideal man, in triumphant action, as seen through the eyes of the woman he loves—and has won—who is rising to join him.

I turn now to a speculation about one important aspect of the characterization: the progressive removal from the novel, and from its hero, of philosophically bad Nietzsche-like elements that Ayn Rand found more and more objectionable and unnecessary in the course of the years she worked on this book. By eliminating from Roark these elements, she refined her characterization of her ideal man. By telling the story of Roark’s triumph—and by living it, as the very writing of the novel constituted a triumph of her own—she eliminated from her own work the last shreds of the Nietzscheanism she rejected. In a sense, Ayn Rand saved Roark from the Nietzsche in him—and Roark may have done the same for her.

Ayn Rand’s ultimate view of Nietzsche, as noted earlier, consisted of an appreciation of his poetic projection of a “magnificent feeling for man’s greatness”—accompanied by negative judgment of his philosophical errors. After being introduced to his writing during her first year of college (by a cousin who said “He has anticipated you. He has said all the things you’re saying”), she read *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, and went on to read most of the rest of Nietzsche’s work, “everything that was translated in Russian.” Although her reaction to his ideas was mixed (and her admiration was seriously undercut by her disagreement with his commentary, in *The Birth of*

Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, on Apollo and Dionysus), the first books she bought in the United States were English translations of *Beyond Good and Evil*, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, and *Anti-Christ*. She marked up her new copies to indicate her favorite passages.³⁴

Reading her markings of *Zarathustra* and *Beyond Good and Evil* in the light of *The Fountainhead*, one notices what seem to be descriptions of the novel's characters. Here, for example, is Roark: "But at the bottom of our souls, quite 'down below,' there is certainly something unteachable, a granite of spiritual fate, of predetermined decision and answer to predetermined, chosen questions. In each cardinal problem there speaks an unchangeable 'I am this.'"³⁵ Here is Toohey: "For to-day have the petty people become master: they all preach submission and humility and policy and diligence and consideration and the long *et cetera* of petty virtues."³⁶ Here is Keating: "a soft, inflated, delicate, movable potter's form, that must wait for some kind of content and form to 'shape' itself thereto—for the most part a man without frame or content, a 'selfless' man."³⁷ Here is Wynand: "There are few pains so grievous as to have seen, divined, or experienced how an exceptional man has missed his way and deteriorated."³⁸ Here is Dominique: "Not to cleave to any person, be it even the dearest—every person is a prison and also a recess. . . . One must know how to conserve oneself—the best test of independence. . . . 'Good' is no longer good when one's neighbour takes it into his mouth. And how could there be a 'common good'! The expression contradicts itself; that which can be common is always of small value."³⁹ And again:

Life is a well of delight; but where the rabble also drink, there all fountains are poisoned.

And many a one who hath turned away from life, hath only turned away from the rabble: he hated to share with them fountain, flame, and fruit.⁴⁰

A reader steeped in Nietzsche might well guess, even without Nietzschean epigraphs, that the author of *The Fountainhead* was familiar with Nietzsche.

Earlier in the present essay, I quoted the passages Ayn Rand had intended to place at the beginning of each part of *The Fountainhead*, as well as the passage that stood at the head of her manuscript; she removed them all. My subject now is not the explicit citations of Nietzsche, but the hints of his language and ideas, hints that are relevant to one of the most intriguing aspects of the novel's composition: the differences between her first and final visions of Roark. I will deal, selectively, with several of these differences.

The first major area pertains to the relationship of the hero to the world outside himself: a noble soul, born to lead, superior to all others, spiritually isolated from a world entirely different from him and entirely hostile to him. Ayn Rand marked the following passage in her copy of *Beyond Good and Evil*:

I submit that egoism belongs to the essence of a noble soul, I mean the unalterable belief that to a being such as "we," other beings must naturally be in subjection, and have to sacrifice themselves. The noble soul accepts the fact of his egoism without question, and also without consciousness of harshness, constraint, or arbitrariness therein, but rather as something that may have its basis in the primary law of things:—if he sought a designation for it he would say: "It is justice itself."⁴¹

She marked, additionally, a passage stating that a society of "a good and healthy aristocracy" must serve as "a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be

able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher existence,” while the others are “reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments.”⁴² She marked a passage in *Zarathustra* pointing to the invulnerable, changeless will: “Yea, something invulnerable, unburiable is with me, something that would rend rocks asunder: it is called *my Will*. Silently doth it proceed, and unchanged throughout the years.”⁴³ The noble soul is resented by all others:

Even when thou art gentle toward them, they still feel themselves despised by thee; and they repay thy beneficence with secret maleficence.

Thy silent pride is always counter to their taste; they rejoice if once thou be humble enough to be frivolous.⁴⁴

And when I lived with them, then did I live above them. Therefore did they take a dislike to me. For men are *not* equal: so speaketh justice.⁴⁵

The noble soul, therefore, is eternally separate:

—at present it belongs to the conception of “greatness” to be noble, to wish to be apart, to be capable of being different, to stand alone, to have to live by personal initiative; and the philosopher will betray something of his own ideal when he asserts: “He shall be the greatest who can be the most solitary, the most concealed, the most divergent, the man beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, and of superabundance of will; precisely this shall be called greatness; as diversified as can be entire, as ample as can be full.”⁴⁶

She marked passages in *Beyond Good and Evil* concerning the “will to power,” and she underlined the following in *Zarathustra*: “and a right which thou canst seize upon, shalt thou not allow to be given thee!”⁴⁷

Her initial image of Roark, in the notebook, has strong parallels with the marked passages in Nietzsche. From her notes of February 9, 1936:

He has learned long ago, with his first consciousness, two things which dominate his entire attitude toward life: his own superiority and the utter worthlessness of the world. . . . Being thoroughly a ‘reason unto himself,’ he does not long for others of his kind, for companionship and understanding. . . . And being a warrior above all, he does not even consider himself a warrior. . . . The world becomes merely a place to act in. But not to feel in. The feeling—all the field of emotions—is in his hand alone . . . born without the ability to consider others. . . . He has a tremendous, unshatterable conviction that he can and will *force* men to accept him, not beg and cheat them into it. He will *take* the place he wants, not receive it from others. . . . Other people do not interest him. He recognizes only the right of exceptions (and by that he means and knows only himself) to create, and order, and command. The others are to bow.⁴⁸

Note that this man deals with other men by “force,” that he “will take the place he wants.” Although it is unlikely that she has in mind physical force, she does not appear to have in mind any sort of rational persuasion, either. To act without considering others, as he is described as doing, amounts to refusing to seek any personal values from others. The distinction between himself and all others is absolute—and its basis is innate.

Ayn Rand's earlier writing had contained similar statements. Kira's Viking, dedicated to "a life that is a reason unto itself," is a benevolent expression of the will to power.⁴⁹ In an entry in her first philosophical notebook (May 16, 1934), she commented that liberal democracies are at fault for "giving full rights to quantity (majorities), they forget the rights of quality, which are much higher rights. Prove that differences of quality not only do exist inexorably, but also should exist. The next step—democracy of superiors only."⁵⁰ The clearest indication of Nietzsche-like elements in writing published during her lifetime was Bjorn Faulkner of *Night of January 16th*: "young, tall, with an arrogant smile, with kingdoms and nations in the palm of one hand—and a whip in the other."⁵¹ Siegurd Jungquist, Faulkner's devoted bookkeeper, acknowledges his role as "instrument" of a higher man: "Herr Lawyer, when little people like you and me meet a man like Bjorn Faulkner, we take our hats off and we bow, and sometimes we take orders; but we don't ask questions."⁵²

Even in the final text of the novel, there are some traces of this view of the hero. Consider the description of Roark's isolation in Stanton. The world resents the noble man: "People turned to look at Howard Roark as he passed. Some remained staring after him with sudden resentment. They could give no reason for it: it was an instinct his presence awakened in most people" (16–17).⁵³ He is alone: "He had not made or sought a single friend on the campus" (25). He is isolated not only in Stanton, but in general: "He was usually disliked, from the first sight of his face, anywhere he went. His face was closed like the door of a safety vault; things locked in safely vaults are valuable; men did not care to feel that" (61–62). Henry Cameron explains the resentment for the noble soul as hatred for "any man who loves his work." Cameron to Roark: "Do you ever look at the people in the street? Aren't you afraid of them? I am. They move past you and they wear hats and they carry bundles. But that's not the substance of them. The substance of them is hatred for any man who loves his work. That's the only kind they fear. I don't know why" (63–64). Roark himself, at one point, thinks of the world—write large or write small—as his enemy: "It was a race he was running now, a race between his rent money and . . . he did not know the name of the other contestant. Perhaps it was every man whom he passed on the street" (175). In his pain, he considers (then rejects) the possibility that he has no chance:

He passed by buildings under construction. He stopped to look at the steel cages, he felt at times as if the beams and girders were shaping themselves not into a house, but into a barricade to stop him; and the few steps on the sidewalk that separated him from the wooden fence enclosing the construction were the steps he would never be able to take. It was pain, but it was a blunted, unpenetrating pain. It's true, he would tell himself; it's not, his body would answer, the strange, untouchable healthiness of his body. (175–76)

The manuscript has even more about his awareness that others resent and fear him for what he is, for what they see in his face (I, 333).

Dominique, in the final text, expresses a similar belief that the exceptional is feared, hated, imperiled.

She had always hated the streets of a city. She saw the faces streaming past her, the faces made alike by fear—fear as a common denominator, fear of themselves, fear of all and of one another, fear making them ready to pounce upon whatever was held sacred by any single one they met. . . . She had liked facing them in the

streets, she had liked the impotence of their hatred, because she offered them nothing to be hurt. (242)

Hence, she deplores the exposure of the Enright House to a world unworthy of it.

A man who can conceive a thing as beautiful as this should never allow it to be erected. He should not want it to exist. But he will let it be built, so that women will hang out diapers on his terraces, so that men will spit on his stairways and draw dirty pictures on his walls. He's given it to them and he's made it part of them, part of everything. He shouldn't have offered it for men like you [Toohey] to look at. For men like you to talk about. He's defiled his own work by the first word you'll utter about it. . . . A man who knows what he must have known to produce this should not have been able to remain alive. (244)

She is, of course, similarly afraid of the exposure of Roark himself to a world unworthy of him.

As readers of the novel, we know that the full story proves Dominique mistaken: the Nietzsche in her, so to speak, was wrong. But an examination of the notebook and the early chapters of the novel shows that, at some stage of composition, the Nietzsche-elements were present in Ayn Rand and in Roark.

But even in the passages I have quoted, there is a significant difference: the noble soul is the man who loves his work—an identification Nietzsche does not make. Roark, moreover, is progressively described as less Nietzsche-like regarding isolation. Whereas Nietzsche believed that the noble soul did not seek others of his kind, Roark is described as actively seeking his kind of face, his kind of person. Hence he is capable of friendship with Mike Donnigan, described as follows in the final text:

He worshipped expertness of any kind. He loved his work passionately and had no tolerance for anything save for other single-track devotions. He was a master in his own field and he felt no sympathy except for mastery. His view of the world was simple: there were the able and there were the incompetent; he was not concerned with the latter. (93)

The characterization of Roark in the later chapters of the novel soundly repudiates the Nietzsche-elements cited above. The view of the world as enemy is ascribed not to Roark, but to other characters—Cameron, Mallory, Dominique, Wynand—all of whom learn from Roark's example and his triumph. The image of the leader to whom others bow, the exponent and practitioner of the will to power, is matched with Wynand—and his life demonstrates the hollowness of that image. Hence Roark is not the enemy of the world. He is not the Nietzschean noble soul, entirely separated from the lesser people, who are mere instruments. His purpose is not to inspire others, but he does so, from the staff who "loved him" as an act of loyalty not "to him, but to the best within themselves" (309) to the Monadnock draftsmen, for whom the work was "the highest experience in the life of every man who took part in it" (508). At his trial, his face and his words evoke a response from the people in the courtroom—whose "faces stood out, separate, lonely, no two alike" (674), each of whom has "known a different sense of living" (675), each of whom, seeing Roark, grasps "the manner of his consciousness" and is thus "free enough to feel benevolence for every other man in the room" (677). He is, as always, independent, but he is not universally hated, or feared, or alone.

I turn now to a particular aspect of the hero's relationship to the world: his romantic encounters. In the passages marked by Ayn Rand, Nietzsche emphasizes man's domination of woman. For example:

The happiness of man is, "I will." The happiness of woman is, "He will."
"Thou goest to women? Do not forget thy whip!"⁵⁴

Nietzsche does not, in any of the passages she marked, treat sexual love as an expression of love: it is entirely an expression of power.

The Roark of the notebook is described, in the entry of February 9, 1936, in terms that recall this Nietzschean treatment of male-female relations:

Until his meeting with Dominique, he has had affairs with women, perfectly cold, emotionless affairs, without the slightest pretense at love. Merely satisfying a physical need and recognized by his mistresses as such.

Moreover:

Even his great and only love—Dominique Wynand—is . . . merely the pride of a possessor. . . . It is primarily a feeling of wanting her and getting her, without great concern for the question of whether she wants it. Were it necessary, he could rape her and feel perfectly justified. . . .

Ayn Rand's earlier writing has passages reminiscent of Nietzsche's language. The "whip" appears in the first edition of *We the Living*.⁵⁵ In *Night of January 16th*, Karen Andre describes her first meeting with Bjorn Faulkner: "He seemed to take a delight in giving me orders. He acted as if he were cracking a whip over an animal he wanted to break."⁵⁶ The whip he implicitly cracks over this woman is analogous to his "whip over the world." Her description of Faulkner's attitude to morality and her attitude to Faulkner, also recalls Nietzsche:

FLINT: Now, tell us, didn't Mr. Faulkner have a clear conception of the difference between right and wrong?

KAREN: Bjorn never thought of things as right or wrong. To him, it was only: you can or you can't. He always could.

FLINT: And yourself? Didn't you object to helping him in all those crimes?

KAREN: To me it was only: he wants or he doesn't.⁵⁷

In these texts, to be sure, the whip is accompanied by love (as is not the case in Nietzsche). The notebook, however, appears to disavow love (in Roark's "cold, emotionless affairs") and to emphasize power and the possibility of rape (in the case of Dominique).

This view, however, begins to disappear even in the manuscript, and is repeatedly contradicted by the final form of the novel. His affairs with Vesta and Heddy, while not described as love, are not cold or emotionless. Nor is Roark indifferent to Dominique's desire, to "whether she wants it." It is true that, in the manuscript, he is described as wishing to "break" Dominique, and he is surprised by his emotions after his first sexual encounter with her: "It had carried no significance in his mind last night; it had been nothing but the released violence of his

body; he knew now that it had been a high point of his spirit” (II, 72). He is portrayed as more “unfinished” in this aspect of his development, as a spiritual work in progress.

But the novel—especially in the later chapters—emphasizes not only the union of body and spirit, but also the spiritual union of these two people, rather than his power over her. In fact, the text subtly suggests that his power over her includes her power over him: “He defeated her by admitting her power; she could not have the satisfaction of enforcing it” (310). His refusal to have power over her in the sense in which she offers it to him—after her marriage to Peter Keating—is a significant milestone in their relationship. He refers to it later, in a conversation with Gail Wynand:

“Howard, have you ever held power over a single human being?”

“No. And I wouldn’t take it if it were offered to me.”

“I can’t believe that.”

“It was offered to me once, Gail. I refused it.”

Wynand looked at him with curiosity; it was the first time that he heard effort in Roark’s voice.

“Why?”

“I had to.”

“Out of respect for the man?”

“It was a woman.”

“Oh, you damn fool! Out of respect for a woman?”

“Out of respect for myself.” (548)

Wynand will eventually learn exactly who is the damn fool regarding the issue of power. Roark already knows exactly what kind of power he has, and what kind of power he refuses—over a woman or anyone else.

I close this analysis of the hero’s relationship to the outside world with a powerful image characteristic of Nietzsche and relevant to the novel—but differently relevant to different stages of composition. In her copy of *Zarathustra*, Ayn Rand marked the following passage:

How many things are still possible! So learn to laugh beyond yourselves! Lift up your hearts, ye good dancers, high! Higher! And do not forget the good laughter!

This crown of the laughter, this rose-garland crown: to you my brethren do I cast this crown! Laughing have I consecrated: ye higher men, learn, I pray you—to laugh!⁵⁸

The phrase “still possible,” of course, was echoed not only in Ayn Rand’s description of the spirit of youth in her “Introduction to the Twenty-fifth Anniversary Edition of *The Fountainhead*,” but, as noted earlier, as a repeated theme for Kira Argounova. Hence, to the extent that Roark’s laughter at the beginning of the novel is related to the Nietzschean laughter,

he is, in effect, taking over where Kira left off. But Nietzsche—and Ayn Rand—had more to say about the laughter of the higher men. She wrote on June 25, 1938: “His laughter as the meaning of the earth around him, as its song, as the release of its tension. Triumphant, the complete ecstasy. (See Nietzsche about laughter.)”⁵⁹ She had copied in her *Fountainhead* notebook the following passage from *Zarathustra*:

O my brethren, I heard a laughter which was no human laughter—and now gnaweth a thirst at me, a longing which is never allayed. My longing for that laughter gnaweth at me: oh, how can I still endure to live! And how could I endure to die at present!⁶⁰

The suggestion of the alien—“no human laughter”—is developed in the notebook through the description of Roark in relation to the world: “The alien. What had been joy in him is now arrogance, what had been strength is now a challenge, what had been freedom is a nameless threat.” The man who laughs on the cliff is the man who is hated on the street.

Laughter in Nietzsche contains elements that pertain to the image of the isolated noble soul, to whom the world is hostile. As we have seen, these elements can be found in the early stages of the characterization of Roark, i.e., in the notebooks and in the early chapters. But in the later parts of the novel, the laughter changes as well. Roark’s laughter is not “no human laughter.” In Mallory’s shack on the site of the Stoddard Temple, in “the ease of complete relaxation,” the “four people who liked being there together” enjoy “the right to their lightness”: “Roark laughed as Dominique had never seen him laugh anywhere else, his mouth loose and young” (336). When Roark “threw back his head and laughed” at the discovery that the Monadnock commission was given to him in an attempt to assure failure, his laughter is dismissive, not defiant—because he does not share Mallory’s shock or his rage (511). Monadnock Valley itself represents laughter triumphant (505). There is no longer need or place for the Nietzsche-like laughter—in the hero’s relation to the outside world.

The second major area in which there are significant differences between the first and final images of the hero pertains to the relationship of her hero to reason, or the mind. The presentation of egoism, in the notebooks, does not initially specify *rational* egoism. The beginning of the *Fountainhead* notebooks (December 4, 1935) emphasize the concept of “egoism as a new faith,” loyalty to one’s own distinct values “for certain definite reasons.” A true egoist is “the man who puts his own ‘I,’ his standard of values, above all things, and conquers to live as he pleases, as he chooses, and as he believes.”⁶¹ Note that she does not specify the basis for the standard of values, and notice also that she refers to the egoist’s achievement as conquest. She explains that the choices, values, and standards are individual (as opposed to concessions to faith or authority), but does not specify reason.

She herself, to be sure, had always identified reason as a high value. But she did not begin her characterization of Roark by describing him as a thinker. Although reason is implicit in independence—because the independent self is the sovereign consciousness—she did not initially present Roark as pursuing a systematic course of thought. The notebooks do not emphasize his thinking, and the early parts of the novel indicate a Nietzsche-like separation of mind from body—with the mind deemed inferior to the body. For example, from Roark’s memory of months at Snyte’s office:

Some unconscious device of self-preservation had shut off within him the faculty of memory. [*crossed out*: he was clear and precise during any one moment of

these days; but the moment past, nothing was left to recall it.] Whatever happened, he had decided without knowing the moment or seconds of decision, as if his body, not his thought, had resolved it for him; whatever happened was not his nor of him and his mind refused it existence in refusing it the eternity [?] of memory.⁶²

From the same period of his life:

There was no mind. There was only a body walking, joyous, in the sheer urgency of motion. He was conscious only of the swing of his thighs, of the muscles of his stomach pulled tight, of his chest and shoulders relaxed, flung forward, being carried tightly, easily, in a long, smooth flight. He wanted to move. He did not care whether or why or that he did not care. (I, 440)

From the period in which he is waiting for commissions (a period discussed earlier, as a race between his rent money and every man he passed on the street, 175–76), the manuscript has the following:

He looked at the steel cages and his sharpest, his clearest perception was only that he could have done them better. That was real. That alone was real. There were moments, as he stood there, when he wanted to move forward, to stop the first worker in sight, to laugh, to ask him what in hell was the fool nonsense he was doing, to tell him what had to be done. For one instant, this impulse was clear and simple and natural, because he had forgotten everything else, he had forgotten the sidewalk on which he stood, the street, the men on the street and everything all these implied. He remembered, almost in the same instant, and he moved, but not toward the workers; he walked on, leaving the structure behind. He was not angry. Only he wondered why the things which stopped him were clear in his mind, but not to something quiet and secret in him, some hidden thing that had closed itself against them; why they were real to his [~~crossed out: mind~~] brain, but not to that thing; why he had accepted them calmly, but the thing would not accept them. And he wondered whether the calm of his acceptance had not come, perhaps, precisely from that one refusal in him, precisely because of that one closed door. (I, 576–77)

At this point in the composition of *Roark*, Ayn Rand describes a conflict between his mind or brain and the “hidden thing.” In the final text, already quoted, the conflict is expressed as follows: “It was pain, but it was a blunted, unpenetrating pain. It’s true, he would tell himself; it’s not, his body would answer, the strange, untouchable healthiness of his body” (176). Her actual point here, as she would have expressed it in full maturity, is almost certainly the conflict between the explicit and the implicit. But present in the language not only of the manuscript but also the final text, is the implication that the “secret thing” or the “body” is wiser than the mind or than what a man consciously “tells himself.” Nietzsche would have endorsed that implication. But as Ayn Rand moved ahead with her novel and her hero, she rejected any such implication, and instead identified the self, the ego, the “I,” explicitly with the mind—and identified selflessness as the mind’s enemy.

Here are a few examples, all from the parts of the novel written in or after December 1941. Kent Lansing tells *Roark*: “Integrity is the ability to stand by an idea. That presupposes the

ability to think. Thinking is something one doesn't borrow or pawn" (313). Roark tells Mallory: "Tell me about the things you *think*" (330). Toohey attacks the mind of his niece, Catherine Halsey, and thus destroys her sense of morality and even her capacity to use language: "Don't think. Believe. Trust your heart, not your brain. Don't think. Feel. Believe." Catherine responds: "I didn't think of it that way. I mean I always thought that I must think . . . But you're right, that is, if right is the word I mean, if there is a word" (365). The *Banner*, at its worst, succeeds by bypassing the mind: "Its enormous headlines, glaring pictures and oversimplified text hit the senses and entered men's consciousness without any necessity for an intermediary process of reason" (409).

But the most dramatic tributes to the mind—and to the mind in relation to the hero—appear in Part Four. At the beginning of this section, a boy on a bicycle, fresh out of college, "wanted to decide whether life was worth living" (503). He is ominously similar to Wynand, who confronted a similar question at the beginning of Part Three. When we meet him, he is in an environment similar to that in which we found Roark, at the beginning of Part One, and he faces that environment with thoughts similar to Roark's.

He could not name the thing he wanted of life. He felt it here, in this wild loneliness. But he did not face nature with the joy of a healthy animal—as a proper and final setting; he faced it with the joy of a healthy man—as a challenge: as tools, means and material.

The setting, and even the language, suggests Nietzsche at his best, glorifying the creator. But the boy's attitude is also close, too close, to Nietzsche's view of the isolation of the noble soul from a hostile world: "He did not want to despise men; he wanted to love and admire them. But he dreaded the sight of the first house, poolroom and movie poster he would encounter on his way" (504).

He is, as it happens, a student of music—the very subject of the Nietzsche text that most undercut Ayn Rand's admiration for Nietzsche, the subject Nietzsche treated as an invitation to celebrate the irrational. This boy, by contrast, wants to find "joy and reason and meaning in life" (503). He seeks happiness and achievement. He discovers Monadnock Valley, which is "a symphony played by an inexhaustible imagination, and one could still hear the laughter of the force that had been let loose on them, as if that force had run, unrestrained, challenging itself to be spent, but had never reached its end" (505). But this "music" is not Nietzsche's music of the irrational: it is, instead, "the discipline of reason—music was mathematics—and architecture was music in stone." He finds the courage to face a lifetime because the valley is real, and Roark built it. Roark rescues the boy from the (potential) Nietzsche in him—and reason is the means of salvation.

Roark's mind—specifically his epistemology—protects Monadnock Valley and the crusaders who built it:

not the content of that thought, nor the result, not the vision that had created Monadnock Valley, nor the will that had made it real—but the method of his thought, the rule of its function—the method and the rule which were not like those of the world beyond the hills. (508)

His trial speech emphasizes the mind:

Man cannot survive except through his mind.

But the mind is an attribute of the individual. . . .

The code of the creator is built on the needs of the reasoning mind which allows man to survive. The code of the second-hander is built on the needs of a mind incapable of survival.

Degrees of ability vary, but the basic principle remains the same: the degree of a man's independence, initiative and personal love for his work determines his talent as a worker and his worth as a man. . . . (679–81)

Nietzsche would never have spoken these words, and Ayn Rand, when she began this novel, did not plan to give these words to Roark. But she found, as she worked, that her subject—first-handedness versus second-handedness—required a tribute to the mind.

As she wrote on an undated page of her notes: “The worst crime of all on earth—to repeat a borrowed opinion. (We can't all be geniuses, but independence of judgment is involved in any act or comment.)”⁶³ We can't all be geniuses. We can't all be what Nietzsche would have called the “higher men.” The moral code of *The Fountainhead*, accordingly, was not a code restricted to geniuses. It was a morality for all men. But anyone can—and should—choose to use his mind. As Ayn Rand completed her novel, she left no doubt on that score.

Her statement of the novel's theme, prepared late in the composition, emphasizes the role of the mind:

Basically, life is consciousness; to live means to think; the fundamental process which constitutes life itself is the process of thought; thought is the creator of all values; the practical application of thought is man's work, his labor, his creative activity—and all labor is a creative activity to some degree. In these two realms—his thought and his labor—Roark is utterly independent of all men. He faces life as if he were the first man born. Nothing stands between the evidence of his senses and the conclusions his mind draws from them. “He is the life-giving principle itself, personified in a man.”⁶⁴

Did Ayn Rand intend to leave in Roark a few subtle hints of the ideas she had rejected, or did she do so inadvertently? When she wrote the early Roark, was she herself in some sense the early Roark? Did she herself share the experience of seeing her enemy as everyone she met in the street? I hesitate to say that she left anything in the novel that was not her best intention. But the final editing of the novel was rushed: she said that, if she had had time, she would have weighed the possibility of revising to bring in Dominique earlier in Part One, once she had eliminated Vesta Dunning. The novel as we know it is, in a sense, chronologically her earliest published fiction. Although *We the Living* was originally published in 1936 and *Anthem* in 1938, she revised them both, in 1959 and 1946 respectively. With a first and final publication date of 1943, *The Fountainhead* is the oldest of the four, and the only one that she completed in haste.

This preliminary study of the novel's composition shows that the Nietzsche-like elements appear prominently in the notebooks, much less so in the manuscript, still less so in the final text, and hardly at all in the sections of the novel written after she signed her contract with Bobbs-Merrill. As she completed and revised her novel, she not only took out the Nietzsche quotations, but also endeavored to eliminate several negative Nietzsche-like elements. Nietzsche implies that there are different moralities for the noble and the others, that the will to power is an expression of strength, that the world is a hostile place for the noble man, that spiritual nobility is innate

rather than self-made, that the noble soul has no commerce with reason. All that, Ayn Rand repudiated.

Before she left Russia, Ayn Rand had rejected Nietzsche's irrationality: in the United States, she did not even purchase a copy of *The Birth of Tragedy*. But until she created her first ideal man, she had not entirely repudiated the rest of his philosophical errors. When she planned and began writing *The Fountainhead*, she included and even emphasized several Nietzschean elements: the world's hostility to Roark, his lack of friends, the opposition between him and the world. But she ultimately changed all of that. The hostility vanished. The friends joined him, and as traders rather than serfs. No longer is any man in the street his enemy, because any man willing to use his own mind is an ally.

Creating the real Roark, residing in his world, she is able to remove any slivers of Nietzscheanism not only from the characterization, but from herself. She knows she can win. Had she ever doubted it? Not often. "But," she writes,

there was one evening . . . when I felt so profound an indignation at the state of "things as they are" that it seemed as if I would never regain the energy to move one step farther toward "things as they ought to be." Frank talked to me for hours, that night. He convinced me of why one cannot give up the world to those one despises. . . . [T]hat night, I told Frank that I would dedicate *The Fountainhead* to him because he had saved it. (vi–vii)

I surmise that the night of that conversation was on or about June 10, 1940. The dedication page in the manuscript bears that date and reads: "To Frank O'Connor who is less guilty of second-handedness than anyone I have ever met."

In the fourth section of her novel, which she began writing on July 4, 1942, she describes a similar experience of tenacity, dedication, and joy. Under the direction of Howard Roark, his old draftsmen are building a summer resort at Monadnock Valley. Ayn Rand writes:

the year at Monadnock Valley remained in their minds as the strange time when the earth stopped turning and they lived through twelve months of spring. They did not think of the snow, the frozen clots of earth, wind whistling through the cracks of planking, thin blankets over army cots, stiff fingers stretched over coal stoves in the morning, before a pencil could be held steadily. They remembered only the feeling which is the meaning of spring—one's answer to the first blades of grass, the first buds on tree branches, the first blue of the sky—the singing answer, not to grass, trees and sky, but to the great sense of beginning, of triumphant progression, of certainty in an achievement that nothing will stop. (508–9)

An achievement nothing could stop, indeed. That honor belongs to the ideal man and to the writer who brought him into being. On the last page of *The Fountainhead*, he stands at the top of the world, higher than any of Nietzsche's "higher men."

But in creating her ideal man, even though she eliminated from him the problematic Nietzsche elements, she was in fact following through on an important insight that she had gained as a result of reading Nietzsche originally. He had saved her, she said, from a philosophical error. Before she read Nietzsche, she had thought that she needed to "defend man as the species," and that she needed to formulate her protest against determinism by presenting the heroic essence of mankind. "But it's a very mistaken formulation philosophically. And what

Nietzsche made me realize is that it doesn't have to be collective. In other words, that the species can be vindicated by one man."⁶⁵ This became her task: to defend her idea of the heroic human spirit not through "the metaphysical original virtue of mankind as such," but specifically through the presentation of a single human being. In her fiction, she projects the human ideal through one individual. That is why, in *The Fountainhead*, the victory of Howard Roark is, as Henry Cameron says, a victory not just for him, "but for something that should win, that moves the world" (133). The ideal man, in himself, vindicates the species. This—whatever else she rejected and repudiated—she learned from Nietzsche.

Howard Roark built skyscrapers. Ayn Rand built Roark.

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NOTES

1. *Fountainhead* notebooks, Ayn Rand Archives. These notebooks, originally in loose-leaf binders, contain dated and undated notes from 1935 through 1942. Unless otherwise indicated, all of my references to the *Fountainhead* notebooks will be drawn from these unpublished, archival materials. I will also draw on additional unpublished, archival materials, identified by name—e.g., Ayn Rand’s first philosophical notebook (1934), and “Outlines for The Fountainhead” and “Synopsis for The Fountainhead,” which were not included in the *Fountainhead* notebooks. All of these materials are in the Ayn Rand Archives. Thanks to Michael Berliner and Jeff Britting for cataloging these materials and providing indispensable guidance in my work with the papers. Some of the material from the *Fountainhead* notebooks, the “Outlines for The Fountainhead,” and “Synopsis for The Fountainhead” has been published in David Harriman, ed., *Journals of Ayn Rand* (New York: Dutton, 1997).

2. She typically dated the first page of each chapter and often also the final page. The manuscripts are contained in eight boxes at the Madison Building of the Library of Congress, where I examined them. The manuscript of each of the four parts of the novel is separately paginated. Unless otherwise indicated, I will refer—by part and page number—to the pages of the holograph, i.e., the first draft. In the Ayn Rand Archives, there are additional loose pages, both holograph and typed, that appear to be contemporaneous with the drafts.

3. Letter from Ayn Rand to Channing Pollock, 10 December 1941, Ayn Rand Archives.

4. Letter from Archibald Ogden to Ayn Rand, n.d., Ayn Rand Archives.

5. Michael S. Berliner, ed., *Letters of Ayn Rand* (New York: Dutton, 1995), 67.

6. Biographical interviews (Ayn Rand Archives).

7. On March 18, 1936, Jennie M. Flexner, Readers’ Advisor at the New York Public Library, prepared an annotated list of more than a dozen books. *Fountainhead* notebooks, Ayn Rand Archives.

8. *Fountainhead* notebooks, Ayn Rand Archives.

9. “Outlines of The Fountainhead,” Ayn Rand Archives.

10. “Outlines of The Fountainhead,” Ayn Rand Archives.

11. “Outlines of The Fountainhead,” Ayn Rand Archives.

12. Some of the material in the present article about the manuscript is a revised version of “Artist at Work: Ayn Rand’s Drafts for *The Fountainhead*,” *The Intellectual Activist*, vol. 15, no. 8 (August 2001), 9–20, and no. 9 (September 2001), 23–30. The two-part article also contains additional information about the manuscripts and some different examples of Ayn Rand’s editing of *The Fountainhead*.

13. Biographical interviews (Ayn Rand Archives).

14. Some of the “extra” scenes, mostly drawn from the first two parts of the novel, have been published in Leonard Peikoff, ed., *The Early Ayn Rand: A Selection from Her Unpublished Fiction* (New York: New American Library, 2005). Ayn Rand’s notes to herself of February 18, 1940, account for several of the omissions in the early part of the novel. See my “Artist at Work,” *The Intellectual Activist*, vol. 15, no. 9 (September 2001), 27–29, for the long conversation between Roark and Toohey, which was excised from Part Four.

15. Biographical interviews (Ayn Rand Archives).

16. *Fountainhead* notebooks, Ayn Rand Archives.

17. “Outlines of The Fountainhead,” Ayn Rand Archives.

18. “Outlines of The Fountainhead,” Ayn Rand Archives.

19. See IV, 587. She similarly omitted contemporary political references in her revision of Toohey’s speech to Keating. Compare the novel, 639, with the draft, IV, 415–19.

20. Ayn Rand, *The Art of Fiction: A Guide for Writers and Readers*, ed. Tore Boeckmann (NY: Plume, 2000), 163.

21. "Theme of 'Second-Hand Lives,'" in "Synopsis of The Fountainhead," Ayn Rand Archives.
22. She marked this passage in her copy of Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, translated by Helen Zimmern (New York: Modern Library, 1917), 226.
23. In the first draft, this scene appears at IV, 513–24. Ayn Rand alluded to the English translation of "*mea maxima culpa*" in "Through Your Most Grievous Fault," her column about the death of Marilyn Monroe (*Los Angeles Times*, 19 August 1962); reprinted in Peter Schwartz, ed., *The Ayn Rand Column*, revised second edition (New Milford, CT: Second Renaissance Books, 1998), 30–32.
24. The epigraphs for Parts 1, 2, and 4 were preserved with the notebooks. The epigraphs for the novel as a whole and for Part 3 were preserved with the manuscript.
25. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 204–5.
26. Ayn Rand marked this passage in her copy of Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, translated by Thomas Common (New York: Modern Library, 1917), 112.
27. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 60.
28. The phrase "the hero in your soul" appears, without explicit reference to Nietzsche, in the fourth-from-last paragraph of Galt's Speech: "Do not let the hero in your soul perish," in Ayn Rand, *Atlas Shrugged*, Thirty-fifth Anniversary Edition (New York: New American Library, 1992), 983.
29. Ayn Rand cited the edition translated by Horace B. Samuel (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1921). I have not been able to examine a hard copy of this book. For context and a different translation, see *On the Genealogy of Morals*, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967), 44.
30. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 87.
31. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 69. Ayn Rand, in her last article for *The Ayn Rand Letter* ("A Final Survey," vol. IV, no. 2 [November–December, 1975], 2), quotes the same passage in reference to herself: "The state of today's culture is so low that I do not care to spend my time watching and discussing it. I am haunted by a quotation from Nietzsche: 'It is not my function to be a fly swatter.'"
32. Ayn Rand, *We the Living*, Sixtieth Anniversary Edition (New York: New American Library, 1996), 25, 235, 464.
33. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 295.
34. Biographical interviews (Ayn Rand Archives). The Archives also contain copies of the translations she read, with markings by John Ridpath that reproduce her original markings.
35. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 161.
36. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 286.
37. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 127.
38. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 117.
39. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 47–48.
40. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 109.
41. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 212.
42. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 198–99.
43. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 124.
44. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 69.
45. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 137.
46. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 138.
47. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 205.
48. *Fountainhead* notebooks, Ayn Rand Archives.
49. The story of Kira's Viking, cut from the manuscript of *We the Living*, was published in Peikoff, ed., *Early Ayn Rand*.
50. "Philosophical Notebook," Ayn Rand Archives.
51. Ayn Rand, *Night of January 16th*, definitive edition (New York: Plume, 1987), 24.
52. Rand, *Night of January 16th*, 80.

53. In her later writing, Ayn Rand would not have stated, in her own voice, that the resentment was due to an instinct.

54. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 81.

55. See my “From *Airtight* to *We the Living*: The Drafts of Ayn Rand’s First Novel,” in *Essays on Ayn Rand’s We the Living*, ed. Robert Mayhew (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington, 2004), 32–33, for a discussion of this scene from *We the Living* (New York: Macmillan, 1936), 398.

56. Rand, *Night of January 16th*, 82.

57. Rand, *Night of January 16th*, 99.

58. Rand, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 295.

59. “Outlines of The Fountainhead,” Ayn Rand Archives.

60. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 168.

61. *Fountainhead* notebooks, Ayn Rand Archives.

62. Scene cut from *The Fountainhead*, 105-23-55A, Ayn Rand Archives.

63. *Fountainhead* notebooks, Ayn Rand Archives.

64. “Theme of ‘Second-Hand Lives,’” in “Synopses of ‘The Fountainhead,’” Ayn Rand Archives.

65. Biographical interviews (Ayn Rand Archives).