Great article, and nice work tackling such a central philosophical issue as free will. I have a suggestion that might help spread Objectivism: take on the question of why so many young men find Stoicism appealing. A few ideas to start with. First, Stoicism offers them a clear vision of masculinity in a culture that seems intent on emasculating them. Second, it provides ethical guidance without religion, which makes it feel practical and at least somewhat grounded in reality. Third, it fits neatly into the self-improvement movement, which promises happiness through following a checklist. I think understanding why Stoicism is so popular would help you figure out how to present Ayn Rand’s ideas to this receptive audience. Thanks for a fine piece.
To continue, Even an actor choosing to initiate action does so in the context of his evaluation that action is called for. Thus, the context of his entre life plays a role in that evaluation. He is compelled to act by that context, not in the sense that he has no free will to choose what action to take but rather that the criteria upon which his choice is based directs him towards that choice. Even if his choice is contrary to his analysis, there is a “cause” for said choice. It is thus determined.
We're not getting anywhere so how's this? Here's how free will can express itself: suppose a grave injustice has been perpetrated upon me. I am consequently so enraged that I decide to shoot the perpetrator. Having stalked him, I am about to press the trigger. The ability and desire to press that trigger resides within me. Should I or shouldn't I? Then, do it or don't do it. Press or don't press. I perform the action or I don't. I am the "cause". I initiated the action. Free will pertains to "action". End of story.
As I said, this is the compatibilist position I address in the essay. But, as you suggest, we're not going to resolve this disagreement here. I appreciate your comments on the essay, and for pushing back on what you disagree with in it.
Then its not clear to me what your suggesting this causal volitional alternative is. It needs to be something more than to say introspection provides the evidence, since that too can be explained deterministically.
You seem to be asserting, in effect, that everything can be explained deterministically [I would challenge that premise], so what does a non-deterministic answer supply that a deterministic one can't. But, at the same time, you're saying that determinism can't be true, because it's self-contradictory. So, there's a puzzle there. Maybe your conception of causality itself is deterministic (this is widespread), so when you think of a choice or action as *caused*, it's natural to ask: well, what caused it to happen (i.e., what factors other than the man's decision to choose, caused him to choose). Am I right about that? So, the answer I give in my article: "Free actions, according to Rand’s theory, are caused not by antecedent events (as determinism would have it), but by the actor choosing to initiate action, fundamentally cognitive action. To say that a process of thought is caused by the actor, does not mean only that it is caused by factors that are internal to the actor rather than external, as many determinists would say. It means that the actor possesses the capacity to initiate action and chose to exercise that capacity" that answer would strike you as unsatisfying. If so, that's because that conception of causality cannot admit the idea (which Objectivism admits) of an entity's (in this case, man's) ability to *initiate* action. On the deterministic model, every effect is caused necessitated by prior events -- so there can be no such thing as an entity initiating (being a first start of) a causal sequence, which is what Objectivism takes the choice to think to be.
Okay. So, you're saying that using determinism's self-contradiction is the only secure, definitive way to dismantle it—without needing to defend a positive alternative that you find less secure? But the moment you corner a determinist with the contradiction, they immediately pivot to: "Fine, if determinism is incoherent, what's your explanation? Magic?" That's exactly what Massimo Pigliucci did when I pointed out the contradiction of determinism to him in an earlier essay. That's actually why he wrote his essay, that I'm responding to here. So, I'm saying: our alternatives are not (as Massimo and many other people see them): determinism (hard or soft) vs magic. There is a conception of volition that is causal, non-magical, non-mystical, that Objectivism provides. Without that positive account, you're left with "determinism can't be right" but no framework to explain how moral agency actually functions. Hence the explanation, however brief, of Objectivism's positive account. So, I think you need both.
I regret to say you haven’t addressed the issue of volition vs. determinism as an aspect of our nature. It is still an open question as to whether the choice to focus or otherwise act or not, has an antecedent cause. An individual’s personal context is that cause. That context includes their biology, conceptual content and their real time appraisal of their current context. This could all be explained from a deterministic perspective regardless of Determinism’s contradictory nature. It is only this contradictory nature which causes determinism to fall on it’s face.
Hi Howard, thanks for the comment. If determinism has a "contradictory nature," as you seem to concede, which (as you say) makes it "fall on its face," then it's false. A false (self-contradictory) theory can't explain anything. So, how is determinism still a contender as an explanatory theory for you, unless you don't actually think it's contradictory or you reject the principle of non-contradiction?
Nothing is "magic" in the sense that it has a supernatural explanation. I think the problem with free will is that it is in many ways casually bound, but the network of causality is so complex that it becomes difficult to trace.
Hi Jay, are you saying that choice is (or may be) deterministic, but the causality involved is difficult to trace because we don't know enough to actually trace the causal chain?
Yes, the network of interconnected causality inside the brain is so complex that it can become "detached" from external driving factors making it seem that we have free will. It's more like a shift of locus of control from the outside to the inside.
Ok, I see. But then the question I would have is: if the causal network involved in volition is too complex for us to actually trace, then how do you know it must be deterministic unless you're starting from the premise of determinism and interpreting anything seemingly nondeterministic as deterministic? If you don't start from the premise of determinism, wouldn't the inability to trace the causality of a given event leave it's status (deterministic /nondeterministic) an open question?
Scientifically, I am a monist and materialist. So I would be starting from those premises. But I would leave open the issue of framing the problem as free will VERSUS determinism, implying an either/or distinction. I see it more as a sliding continuum. People who abrogate decision making and act on impulse are yielding their behavior to external causes. Those who think carefully before acting and weigh possible outcomes take more internal control over their behavior.
But Aaron, an important point of hard-core physical determinism is that all external factors that affect us must also include whatever philosophy we read. Hence, we have no choice but to be influenced by philosophy and often this includes making us ‘better’.
Yes. A hard-core physical determinist could or would say that. But Pigliucci is attempting to chart what he thinks is a compatibilist middle ground and thus hang on to some notion of agency. The question is whether he can, given his determinism. I argue that he can't.
Great article, and nice work tackling such a central philosophical issue as free will. I have a suggestion that might help spread Objectivism: take on the question of why so many young men find Stoicism appealing. A few ideas to start with. First, Stoicism offers them a clear vision of masculinity in a culture that seems intent on emasculating them. Second, it provides ethical guidance without religion, which makes it feel practical and at least somewhat grounded in reality. Third, it fits neatly into the self-improvement movement, which promises happiness through following a checklist. I think understanding why Stoicism is so popular would help you figure out how to present Ayn Rand’s ideas to this receptive audience. Thanks for a fine piece.
Thanks a lot, Jim. I do plan to write more about Stoicism. So, stay tuned.
Excellent article!
Thanks, Steven.
Even classical physics loses all predictability from tiny errors. Quantum just confirms it: the future’s unpredictable either way.
Determinism, Stoic or otherwise, erases the acting individual. Society is not fate unfolding. It is the unintended result of free, fallible choices.
Without genuine agency there is no responsibility, no discovery, no spontaneous order, only the illusion of necessity.
To continue, Even an actor choosing to initiate action does so in the context of his evaluation that action is called for. Thus, the context of his entre life plays a role in that evaluation. He is compelled to act by that context, not in the sense that he has no free will to choose what action to take but rather that the criteria upon which his choice is based directs him towards that choice. Even if his choice is contrary to his analysis, there is a “cause” for said choice. It is thus determined.
This is the standard compatibilist line, which I addressed in my essay.
We're not getting anywhere so how's this? Here's how free will can express itself: suppose a grave injustice has been perpetrated upon me. I am consequently so enraged that I decide to shoot the perpetrator. Having stalked him, I am about to press the trigger. The ability and desire to press that trigger resides within me. Should I or shouldn't I? Then, do it or don't do it. Press or don't press. I perform the action or I don't. I am the "cause". I initiated the action. Free will pertains to "action". End of story.
As I said, this is the compatibilist position I address in the essay. But, as you suggest, we're not going to resolve this disagreement here. I appreciate your comments on the essay, and for pushing back on what you disagree with in it.
Then its not clear to me what your suggesting this causal volitional alternative is. It needs to be something more than to say introspection provides the evidence, since that too can be explained deterministically.
You seem to be asserting, in effect, that everything can be explained deterministically [I would challenge that premise], so what does a non-deterministic answer supply that a deterministic one can't. But, at the same time, you're saying that determinism can't be true, because it's self-contradictory. So, there's a puzzle there. Maybe your conception of causality itself is deterministic (this is widespread), so when you think of a choice or action as *caused*, it's natural to ask: well, what caused it to happen (i.e., what factors other than the man's decision to choose, caused him to choose). Am I right about that? So, the answer I give in my article: "Free actions, according to Rand’s theory, are caused not by antecedent events (as determinism would have it), but by the actor choosing to initiate action, fundamentally cognitive action. To say that a process of thought is caused by the actor, does not mean only that it is caused by factors that are internal to the actor rather than external, as many determinists would say. It means that the actor possesses the capacity to initiate action and chose to exercise that capacity" that answer would strike you as unsatisfying. If so, that's because that conception of causality cannot admit the idea (which Objectivism admits) of an entity's (in this case, man's) ability to *initiate* action. On the deterministic model, every effect is caused necessitated by prior events -- so there can be no such thing as an entity initiating (being a first start of) a causal sequence, which is what Objectivism takes the choice to think to be.
Hi Aaron, you misunderstood my meaning. I'm saying that Determinism's contradictory nature is the only way to sucessfully reject it.
Okay. So, you're saying that using determinism's self-contradiction is the only secure, definitive way to dismantle it—without needing to defend a positive alternative that you find less secure? But the moment you corner a determinist with the contradiction, they immediately pivot to: "Fine, if determinism is incoherent, what's your explanation? Magic?" That's exactly what Massimo Pigliucci did when I pointed out the contradiction of determinism to him in an earlier essay. That's actually why he wrote his essay, that I'm responding to here. So, I'm saying: our alternatives are not (as Massimo and many other people see them): determinism (hard or soft) vs magic. There is a conception of volition that is causal, non-magical, non-mystical, that Objectivism provides. Without that positive account, you're left with "determinism can't be right" but no framework to explain how moral agency actually functions. Hence the explanation, however brief, of Objectivism's positive account. So, I think you need both.
I regret to say you haven’t addressed the issue of volition vs. determinism as an aspect of our nature. It is still an open question as to whether the choice to focus or otherwise act or not, has an antecedent cause. An individual’s personal context is that cause. That context includes their biology, conceptual content and their real time appraisal of their current context. This could all be explained from a deterministic perspective regardless of Determinism’s contradictory nature. It is only this contradictory nature which causes determinism to fall on it’s face.
Hi Howard, thanks for the comment. If determinism has a "contradictory nature," as you seem to concede, which (as you say) makes it "fall on its face," then it's false. A false (self-contradictory) theory can't explain anything. So, how is determinism still a contender as an explanatory theory for you, unless you don't actually think it's contradictory or you reject the principle of non-contradiction?
Nothing is "magic" in the sense that it has a supernatural explanation. I think the problem with free will is that it is in many ways casually bound, but the network of causality is so complex that it becomes difficult to trace.
Hi Jay, are you saying that choice is (or may be) deterministic, but the causality involved is difficult to trace because we don't know enough to actually trace the causal chain?
Yes, the network of interconnected causality inside the brain is so complex that it can become "detached" from external driving factors making it seem that we have free will. It's more like a shift of locus of control from the outside to the inside.
Ok, I see. But then the question I would have is: if the causal network involved in volition is too complex for us to actually trace, then how do you know it must be deterministic unless you're starting from the premise of determinism and interpreting anything seemingly nondeterministic as deterministic? If you don't start from the premise of determinism, wouldn't the inability to trace the causality of a given event leave it's status (deterministic /nondeterministic) an open question?
Scientifically, I am a monist and materialist. So I would be starting from those premises. But I would leave open the issue of framing the problem as free will VERSUS determinism, implying an either/or distinction. I see it more as a sliding continuum. People who abrogate decision making and act on impulse are yielding their behavior to external causes. Those who think carefully before acting and weigh possible outcomes take more internal control over their behavior.
But Aaron, an important point of hard-core physical determinism is that all external factors that affect us must also include whatever philosophy we read. Hence, we have no choice but to be influenced by philosophy and often this includes making us ‘better’.
Yes. A hard-core physical determinist could or would say that. But Pigliucci is attempting to chart what he thinks is a compatibilist middle ground and thus hang on to some notion of agency. The question is whether he can, given his determinism. I argue that he can't.